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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UPON IMPROPERLY
EXECUTED CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
Can a municipality be liable in quasi contract? What recourse is
available to the individual or corporation whose contract with a
municipality does not comply with the specific statutory requirements prescribed by the legislature? This comment will attempt to
examine these two problems, investigate the many circumstances
where they may arise and analyze the rational of the courts in permitting or denying recovery. In the light of the vast number of municipalities existing in Pennsylvania, particular attention will be directed to that state.1
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The type of a statute involved in this discussion provides generally
that, "all contracts, or purchases made by any [municipality] involving the expenditure of over $500 (or any given amount) shall
be in writing .... Any contract made in violation of the provisions
hereof shall be void ....,,2

Recognizing that a municipality exists by will of the legislature and
is subject to the regulations and control of that body, most jurisdictions perceive these statutory provisions as mandatory and not merely
directory.3 This being so, the courts will not assist a claimant to
circumvent the mandate of the statute by permitting a recovery upon
4
a quantum meruit basis.

1. It has been estimated that there are approximately from 150,000 to 200,000
local governmental units in the United States. 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 286, § 1.83 (3d ed. 1949).
2.

Township Act of July 18, 1935, P.L. 1176, as amended, § 1802, PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 53, § 56802.
3. Yoder v. Luzerne Twp. School Diat., 399 Pa. 425, 160 A.2d 419 (1960);
Harris v. Philadelphia, 283 Pa. 496, 129 Atl. 460 (1925).
4.

Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Milcreek Twp., 335 Pa. 529, 6 A.2d 916 (1939),

sewer system installed under an oral contract; Morgan v. Johnstown, 306 Pa. 456,
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Before detailing the reason underlying the general rule, the exception to it, and the opposing view, an attempt should be made to
dispel some of the confusion that exists concerning the distinction
between contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law,
which are more frequently termed quasi contracts. Judge Maris of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has very capably pointed
out this distinction. "A quasi contract ...

is not to be confused with a

contract implied in fact, which is an actual contract, and which
arises where the parties agree upon the obligations to be incurred,.
• . . Quasi contracts . . . are not based on the apparent intention

of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are
they promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons of

justice." 5
Quasi contractual recovery rests upon the equitable principle that
a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the ex-

160 Atl. 696 (1931); Reilly v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 467 (1869); Hague v. City of
Philadelphia, 48 Pa. 527 (1865); Newhurd v. North Union Twp. School Dist., 170
Pa. Super. 477, 87 A.2d 98 (1952); Price v. Taylor Borough School Dist., 157 Pa.
Super. 188, 42 A.2d 99 (1945); In re Sykesville Borough, 91 Pa. Super. 335
(1927).
Other cases in which recovery was denied either on the express contract or
upon a quasi contractual basis are:
Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Allegheny County, 406 Pa. 134, 176 A.2d 630
(1962), contract to replace gas lines which was not properly approved; Patterson
v. Delaware County, 404 Pa. 5, 171 A.2d 47 (1961), contract to rent excavating
equipment to county; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Darby Twp., 20 Pa. D. & C. 2d
543 (1959), aff'd per curiam at 399 Pa. 492, 160 A.2d 706 (1960); Commonwealth
v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 379 Pa. 411, 109 A.2d 184 (1954), contract to transport whiskey not properly executed; Coyle v. Pittsburgh, 344 Pa. 426, 25 A.2d
707 (1942), real estate broker employed under an oral contract to appraise certain property; Charleroi Lumber Co. v. Bentleyville Borough School Dist., 334 Pa.
424, 6 A.2d 88 (1939), the cost of building a school was considerably higher than
the amount authorized by the electors; Luzerne Twp. v. Fayette County, 330 Pa.
247, 199 Atl. 327 (1938); Kuhn v. Commonwealth, 291 Pa. 497, 140 Atl. 527 (1928);
Commonwealth ex rel. v. Jones, 283 Pa. 582, 129 Atl. 635 (1925).
Nuebling v. Topton Borough, 323 Pa. 154, 185 Atl. 725 (1936), contract to
design borough water plants; Wilkes-Barre Connecting R.R. v. Kingston
Borough, 319 Pa. 471, 181 Atl. 564 (1935), contract for the installation of a sewer
line; Union Paving Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 263 Pa. 577, 107 Atl. 370 (1919);
Trevorton Water Supply Co. v. Zerbe Twp., 259 Pa. 31, 102 Ati. 328 (1917),
installation of fire hydrants; Philadelphia Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 147,
97 Atl. 1083 (1916), contract to supply gas; Miller v. Philadelphia, 231 Pa. 196,
80 Atl. 68 (1911); Smart v. Philadelphia, 205 Pa. 329, 54 Atl. 1025 (1903), contract to repair a street; J. A. Kreis & Co. v. City of Knoxville, 145 Tenn. 297, 237
S.W. 55 (1921), oral alteration of a contract; Watterson v. Mayor, etc., of City
of Nashville, 106 Tenn. 410, 61 S.W. 782 (1901).
5. American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah,
115 F.2d 866 (3rd Cir. 1940), at 867.
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pense of another. 6 Payment should be made for benefits received or

these benefits should be returned. This doctrine, however, does not
7
apply to a municipality.
A municipality is not liable for the benefit of services received
under an invalid contract when these benefits

cannot be sur-

rendered, and the retention of them is therefore involuntary. 8 There
cannot be an implied obligation on the part of the municipality to
make payments for the benefits received because such a recovery
would defeat the purpose of the statute. 9
Statutes which prescribe the form and method of contracts for
municipal governments are intended as safeguards to protect the
citizenry from fraud and dishonesty.

They serve as barricades to

raids upon the public funds. To allow a quasi contractual recovery
to "circumvent" these statutes would defeat the very purpose of
their enactment. The Restatement of Restitution indicates that such
a recovery "would seriously impair the protection intended to be
afforded by . . . [the] statute."' 1 0
6.
7.

Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337 (1916).
6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938), § 1786A.

8. Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 607, 139 A.2d 347 (1958), cited in
20 U. Prr L. REV. 253 & 310; Commonwealth v. Seagrams Distillers Corp., aupra
note 4; Coyle v. Pittsburgh, supra note 4; Charleroi Lumber Co. v. Bentleyville
Borough School Dist., supra note 3; Luzerne Twp. v. Fayette County, supra
note 4.
9. Hague v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 4; McDonald v. New York, 68
N.Y. 23, 28 (1876).
10. Section 62. TRANSFEREE PROTECTED BY PUBLIC POLICY.
Comment b: Thus an infant to whom a person has transferred a nonnecessary in the course of a contract is not under a duty of restitution to
the transferor upon failure to pay for it, if the subject matter or its
product is not available at the time when restitution is sought. The rule
may also apply in the protection of the citizens of a community where
a contract which is contrary to the provisions of a statute has been made
by its officers on its account .... [A] person who renders services to

a municipality under a contract violating the terms of such a statute is
not entitled to receive either the contract price or the reasonable value
of his services.
In Illustration 2, the Restatement provides the reader with an example of
such a contract:
In state X a statute provides that no contract for work to be done
for a municipality where the contract price exceeds $10,000 shall be
made unless it has been passed upon at a regular session of the municipal
council duly called. A [a construction outfit], contracts with the city of
Y for dredging for the price of $50,000, the contract being approved
only by the municipal officers. Upon completion of the work, A is not
entitled to reasonable compensation from Y although he believed that
the council had approved the contract or although he did not know of
the statute.
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It is the obligation of the person dealing with the municipality
to protect himself by securing a written contract complying with
the terms of the statute." "He who deals with a municipality must
recognize that it can contract only upon such terms as the legislature has seen fit to prescribe."' 1 2 This person also has the burden
to inquire into the authority of public officers to bind the govern3
ment they represent.'
Full force has been given to restrictive statutes of the
state, and implied liability denied, and the doctrine established that public officers can incur obligations against those
for whom they act, only in pursuance of the provisions of the
statutes, and that they cannot deal upon the quantum meruit
or reasonable value plan ....

A strict adherence to the provi-

sions of the restrictive statutes of the state will be for the
general good, and it devolves upon those who deal with
public officers to see for themselves that the statutes have
been complied with ....
There being no implied municipal
liability in cases ex contractu . . ., it follows that to state a

good cause of action against a municipality in such cases,
the petition must declare upon a contract ....

made and en-

tered into according to statute. A petition on an account
merely, or quantum meruit, in such cases, is not suffi14
cient ...
CASES IN WHICH A QUASI CONTRACTUAL
RECOVERY IS ALLOWED
a. The Object Received by the Municipality is Returnable
The earlier judicial decisions expressed the view that recovery
could not be had against municipalities even though money or
property received was still held by the municipality in specie. 1 5
Gradually, however, the courts realized that certain inequities could
and should be remedied and created exceptions to this firmly entrenched rule of law. Where restitution could be made in specie,
the court imposed an implied obligation on the municipality to
restore the other party to the status quo.' 6 This, they said, would
in no way defeat the protection of the statute.
11. Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Millcreek Twp., supra note 4.
12. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Jones, supra note 4.
13. Willis v. York County Directors of the Poor, 284 Pa. 138, 130 Atl. 401
(1925); Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 40 Pa. Super. 416 (1909); McGovern v.
City of Boston, 229 Mass. 394, 118 N.E. 667 (1918).
14. City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Ohio 219, 62 N.E. 127 (1901).
15. Buchanan v. City of Litchfield, Illinois, 102 U.S. 278 (1880).
16. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, § 62, Comment b. "Likewise where a statute
provides a debt limit beyond which it is illegal ... to go, a person lending money
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This exception has been invoked where money has been paid
or lent to a governmental body under either an invalid or procedurally defective contract.1 7 "Where a municipality issues an express contract or formal obligation which is void because of the
failure of its authorities to comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirements, an action for money had and received by
the lender of the money will lie." s
The courts reason that the benefits of this transaction can be
surrendered and restitution will not violate the fundamental policy
underlying the statute. 1 9
This exception is also applicable when taxes have been wrongfully
collected by the governmental body,2 0 or where the particular sub21
ject matter of the contract can be returned in specie.
to a municipality in excess of such limit may not be entitled to restitution. In
cases of this type, however, if restitution can be granted without harm to the
persons protected, it will not be denied.... [Wlhere a municipality has received
money in excess of the debt limit, restitution may be granted if the money has
not been used; [or] if the money has been expended in the reduction of the law[T]his would not violate the fundamental purpose of
ful debts of the town ....
the statute."
17. McGregor Estate v. Young Twp., 350 Pa. 93, 38 A.2d 313 (1944);
Ohlinger v. Maidencreek Twp., 312 Pa. 289, 167 Atl. 882 (1933); Long v. Lemoyne
Borough, 222 Pa. 311, 71 Atl. 211 (1908); First National Bank of Monongahela
City v. Carroll Twp., 150 Pa. Super. 241, 27 A.2d 527 (1942); Greenwich Bank v.
Commercial Banking Corp.. 85 Pa. Super. 159 (1925); McAvoy & McMichael,
Ltd. v. Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Co., 27 Pa. Super. 271 (1905);
Paul v. City of Kenosha, 22 Wis. 256 (1867).
18. Cameron Bank v. Aleppo Twp., 338 Pa. 300, 303, 13 A.2d 40 (1940).
The township borrowed money but it did not comply with article IX, §10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution which requires that when a debt is incurred, an annual
tax must be provided which is sufficient to pay the interest and principal within
30 years.
19. 38 AM. JUR., Municipal Corporations, § 521.
20. Bank of Holyrood v. Kottmann, 132 Kan. 593, 296 Pac. 357 (1931);
Fox Valley Canning Co. v. Village of Hortonville, 207 Wis. 502, 242 N.W. 142
(1932); Carolina & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Town of Clover, S.C., 46 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.
1931); Quick Service Tire Co. v. Smith, 156 Tenn. 96, 299 S.W. 807 (1927);
Gould v. Board of Comm'rs of Hennepin County, 76 Minn. 379, 79 N.W. 530 (1899).
However, some authorities say that in order for recovery to be granted, the
plaintiff must have registered a protest at the time payment was made. They
reason that if the taxpayer did not make a protest at the time of payment, the
payment was not involuntary and there can be no recovery. This conclusion is
based upon the reasoning that a person may not recover something which he
voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of a registered complaint or protest, it
can be said that the payment was voluntary and therefore, recovery should be
denied. General Discount Corp. v. City of Detroit, 306 Mich. 458, 11 N.W. 2d 203
(1943). See also 17 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 49.62 and 49.63 (3d
ed. 1950).
21. Hale v. Borough of Ashland, 260 Pa. 547, 103 Atl. 1018 (1918).
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The Restatement of Restitution indicated the rational for this
exception, but notes that unless the money has been expended to
extinguish a properly incurred municipal indebtedness, restitution
would violate the fundamental purpose of the statute. 2 2 What is
the result where the money has not been spent for a proper municipal purpose, and is no longer in the treasury? Do we still require the city to repay the money? Such a situation would be extremely rare and this issue has not confronted any court; although,
if such a situation were presented, reason might dictate no recovery.
With the exception of the "emergency situations" which will be
discussed infra, 2 3 these are the only instances in which Pennsyl24
vania will permit a recovery on a quasi contractual basis.
b.

Minority View

As has been pointed out, the Pennsylvania courts will allow a plaintiff to recover if the benefit received by the municipality can be
surrendered. The Third Circuit, however, in American LaFrance
Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah,2 5 permitted a recovery
on quasi contractual principles for the reasonable rental value of
fire apparatus which was in the possession of the municipality under
an invalid contract. Apparently, the court in this case misinterpreted
the existing Pennsylvania law. The benefit received by the borough
could not be surrendered. The precedents cited by the American
LaFrance court as a basis for its holding had allowed a quasi contractual remedy solely because the benefits received by the mu26
nicipalities could be returned.
While we have seen that Pennsylvania permits this very limited
quasi contractual recovery, this has not been the view taken by
other courts. These opposing states have held that where a governmental body receives substantial benefits under a contract which
it was authorized to make, but which was void because irregularly
22.

Section 62, Comment b. See illustrations 3 and 4:
In State X, municipalities are forbidden to borrow more than $100 per
capita. The city of Y, having reached its debt limit of $2,000,000, borrows
$1,000,000 from A. If the money is still in the bank to the credit of the city, or
if the money is used to extinguish an equal amount of Y's properly incurred
indebtedness, the total debt of the city after the payment being less than
$2,000,000 including A's claim, in either situation, A may recover.
23. See text at notes 34-36, infra.
24. Luzerne Twp. v. Fayette County, supra note 4.
25. Supra note 5.
26. The cases cited as authority for the court's action were: Cameron Bank
v. Aleppo Twp., supra note 18, and Luzerne Twp. v. Fayette County, supra note 4.
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executed, it is liable in an action brought to recover the reasonable
27
value of the benefits received.
In two states attorneys were permitted to recover the reasonable
value of their services. 2 8 In still another case, a plaintiff was allowed a recovery for the value of the benefit received by a city when
it used the plaintiff's asphalt plant in making asphalt for repairs
on its streets. 29 These courts expressed the liberal view that recovery may be had whether one furnished money, property, or personal services and this principle applies with equal force to each. 3 0
In states which have granted relief on this liberal theory, 3 1 recovery is allowed even though the statutory requirements are not
complied with. This result is reached by concluding that the statutory requirements are merely directive and not mandatory. 3 2 They
conclude that the legislature only intended to prohibit recoveries of
the contract price, but did not intend to bar an action based on rea33
sonable value.
OTHER CASES IN WHICH RECOVERY IS PERMITTED
The courts in many circumstances will allow recovery upon what
they term "quasi contract," when in reality, they are misconstruing
the term and are actually granting recovery upon contracts impliedin-fact rather than contracts implied-in-law. This indicates the
courts' willingness to permit a recoupment of losses by deserving
27. Nebraska Bitulithic Co. v. City of Omaha, 84 Neb. 375, 121 N.W. 443
(1909).
28. Sluder v. City of San Antonio, 2 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1928). Vernon v.
Board of Comm'rs of Edwards County, 132 Kan. 119, 294 Pac. 871 (1931).
29. Nebraska Bitulithic Co. v. City of Omaha, supra note 27. See also,
Wakely v. County of St. Louis, 184 Minn. 613, 240 N.W. 103 (1931). It was held
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in quasi contract an amount equal to
the benefits that the county received from the purchase of clay and sand from
the plaintiff that were then used in improving a highway.
30. Sluder v. City of San Antonio, supra note 28.
.31. Cases in accord with this view are: Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed.
457 (8th Cir. 1900); Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351, 362 (1863); Argenti
v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 256 (1860); Wheeler v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 105, 107
(1860); Norway v. Clear Lake, 11 Iowa 506, 508 (1861); Knowlton v. Plantation,
14 Me. 20 (1836); Atkins v. Barnstable, 97 Mass. 428, 429 (1867); Clark v. Board
of County Comm'rs of Saline County, 9 Neb. 516 (1880); Wait v. Ormsby County,
1 Nev. 370; Armitage v. Essex Constr. Co., 88 N.J.L. 640, 96 Atl. 889 (1916);
Ephrata Water Co. v. Ephrata Borough, 16 Pa. Super. 484 (1901).
32. See Note, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 64, 68 (1932).
33. Fargo Foundry Co. v. Village of Calloway, 148 Minn. 273, 181 N.W.
584 (1921). See also, WINFIELD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS, 136 (1952), citing
WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1913).
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plaintiffs. The following subsections can be classed as a breakaway
from the firmly entrenched general principle.
a.

Emergency Situations

In some instances the courts will allow recovery even though services were performed under oral contracts. The most common of these
situations is when municipal policemen transport ill and wounded
indigent persons to hospitals for treatment. 3 4 Claims are then made
against the municipality to pay for the medical services received by
the indigent persons who are unable to pay the hospital for the
medical services rendered. The courts will usually allow recovery
by the hospitals and will not require that formal express contracts
be executed between the hospitals and the policemen because of the
emergency situations that existed at the time the services were
rendered. This holding is usually based upon the reasoning that the
hospital performed a duty that belonged to the municipality under
the principle of parens patriae, namely, the duty of rendering medical services to persons within its boundaries. 3 5
The courts have utilized the emergency doctrine in cases where a
plaintiff performed services for a municipality under an oral contract, which services would protect, insure or promote the health
36
or safety of the residents of the community.
b.

Fraud or Duress

Whenever fraud 3 7 or duress 38 is involved on the part of a municipal
official in inducing an innocent party to enter into an improperly
executed contract, the plaintiff will usually be permitted to recover
even though the statutory procedure has not been followed. The
34.

Mercy Hosp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 15 Pa. D. & C. 2d 603 (Pa. Com. Pi.

1957).

35. County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, (1882); Crouse Irving
Hosp. v. City of Syracuse, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 433 (1954), aff'd. 308 N.Y. 844, 126 N.E.
2d 179 (1955). But see, Mandan Deaconess Hosp. v. Sioux County, 63 N.D. 538,
248 N.W. 924 (1933) where it was held that in the absence of statute, a municipality is not required to pay for the support of its indigent residents and a hospital
which rendered services to such poor persons could not recover.
36. Maguire v. Philadelphia, 66 Pa. Super. 300 (1917), garbage collection
involving public health; Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210
Cal. 348, 291 Pac. 839 (1930), the hauling away of dredged materials in order to
protect public health; North River Elec. Light & Power Co. v. City of New York,
48 App. Div. 14, 62 N.Y.S. 726 (1900), oral contract for the installation of street
lights; Automatic Voting Mach. Corp. v. Witkins, 64 Pa. D. & C. 171 (1948);
Upper Darby Twp. v. Ramsdell Constr. Co., 51 Pa. D. & C. 246 (1943).
37. Teall v. City of Syracuse, 120 N.Y. 184, 24 N.E. 450 (1890).
38. Mee v. Town of Montclair, 83 N.J.L. 274, 83 Atl. 764 (1912).
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municipality will be held chargeable with knowledge of the unlawful
proceedings of its officers.
c.

Ratification and Estoppel
3 9

The courts on rare occasions resort to the measures of ratification
and estoppel 40 in order to permit a plaintiff to recover so as to relieve the hardships that would otherwise result. The concept of
ratification is brought into effect in one of two ways: (1) an express,
formal affirmance of the contract in the manner prescribed by statute ;41 or (2) an implied affirmance through conduct which indicates
an acceptance of the contract. 4 2 While an implied ratification is
often discussed, the courts generally require that the ratification
comply with all the formalities required by law in the first instances.4 3

In order for a court to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, gross
inequities must exist whereby the result would be extremely unfair
if the plaintiff was denied recovery. 4 4 It is generally held that a mu-

nicipality will not be estopped by reason of its acceptance and re-

45
tention of the benefits of the contract.

In cases in which estoppel is applied, the municipal officers must
act with knowledge of the material facts and the plaintiff must

justifiably rely upon the officers' actions and be induced to change
his position.46 The city will then not be permitted to present the
39. Webb v. Wakefield Twp., 239 Mich. 521, 215 N.W. 43 (1927); Rogers v.
City of Omaha, 76 Neb. 187, 107 N.W. 214 (1906); New Jersey Car-Spring &
Rubber Co. v. City of Jersey City, 64 N.J.L. 544, 46 Atl. 649 (1900); City of
Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 17 N.E. 587 (1888).
40. Aspinwall-Delafield Co. v. Borough of Aspinwall, 229 Pa. 13, 77 Atl.
1098 (1910); Peterson v. City of Ionia, 152 Mich. 678, 116 N.W. 562 (1908).
41. Cole v. Burton, 313 Ky. 557, 232 S.W.2d 838 (1950).
42. City of Denver v. Webber, 15 Colo. App. 511, 63 Pac. 804 (1900); Johnson v. Hospital Service Plan of N. J., 25 N.J. 134, 135 A.2d 483 (1957); Bock v.
Reading, 120 Pa. Super. 468, 182 Atl. 732 (1936). See also, 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 29.106 (3d ed. 1949).

43. Ballagh Realty Co. v. Borough of Dumont, 111 N.J.L. 32, 166 Atl. 491
(1933); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Detman Twp., 62 N.D. 465, 244 N.W. 876
(1932).
44. Aebli v. Board of Education of City and County of San Francisco, 62
Cal. App. 2d 706, 145 P. 2d 601 (1944), citing 19 AM. JuR., Estoppel 818, § 166.
See also, McGee v. Los Angeles, 51 P.2d 1109 (Cal. App. 1936), rev'd. on otnler
grounds 6 Cal.2d 390, 57 P.2d 925 (1936).
45. Charleroi Lumber Co. v. Bentleyville Borough School Dist., supra note 4.
46. Denver & S. L. Ry. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist.. 35 F.2d 365
(D. Colo. 1929).
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contention that the contract was improperly executed or that the
municipal officers failed to formally ratify the contract. Since the
municipality has received the benefits of the contract, arguments
7
such as these will not be permitted to prevail. 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It can be generally stated that a quasi contractual recovery against
municipalities will not be permitted. Pennsylvania, along with a majority of her sister states follows the general rule. This is based upon
the reasoning that the legislative requirements are mandatory and
not merely directive. The requirements prescribed by statute are
conditions precedent to recovery. A recoupment through quasi contract can only defeat the public policy behind these statutes, and
therefore, will generally not be allowed.
Exceptions to this general rule are made in the so called "emergency situations" where the plaintiff rendered his services in the
performance of a function designed to protect the health or safety
of the inhabitants of the community. Recovery is also allowed when
money or property received by the municipality can be returned in
specie or it has been used to extinguish a properly incurred indebtedness of the governmental body.
The minority view allows a quasi contractual recovery in all instances in which the municipality has been unjustly enriched. It
considers the statute merely as a limiting factor governing the
aspect of damages.
It is questionable whether the majority view is based upon sound
judicial reasoning. This principle arose many years ago when municipal bodies were small and funds were limited. The courts, in an
attempt to protect the little country village, established this doctrine
so as to insure the body politic adequate protection against the dishonesty or lack of wisdom of the town officers. It is possible to compare this contractual immunity with other antiquated doctrines that
have not yet been abolished, i.e., charitable immunity and the requirement of privity in a breach of warranty action. Municipalities,
like hospitals, have grown from struggling, young organizations into
"big businesses." If we can accept the last statement, then the question presented is: Does the need for municipal contractual immunity
47. See Mt. Vernon v. State, 71 Ohio St. 428, 73 N.E. 515 (1905), where at
519, the court said that a municipal contract which is neither ultra vires, illegal,
nor malum prohibitum will be enforced against the municipal corporation and
the municipality will be estopped from setting up a defense, if the facts are such
as would estop an individual from making such a defense.
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still exist? Unfortunately, the courts answer this question in the
affirmative.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that any person performing
services for a municipality should take precautions to adhere to the
prescribed statutory procedure lest he endanger his possibility of
recovery.

THE PERMISSIVE AREA OF
STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
INTRODUCTION
Since the "Civil Rights Cases"' many states have passed legislation
proscribing discrimination in various areas, including public accommodations, employment, and housing. The courts have coped with
various arguments, both ingenious and ingenuous, attacking the
validity of State "Fair Practices" Acts, but generally have sustained
the legislation.
However, increasing concern is being voiced by the proponents of
such state legislation in reaction to constitutional grounds raised in
two recent cases to be discussed later in this comment. The arguments raised have been stated within the framework of the wellknown and settled doctrines of "federal pre-emption," and the "negative implication doctrine," drawn from the plenary power of Congress
in the area of interstate commerce. But in reality the ratio decidendi
of these cases is the extent of permissible state action in areas where
the federal government has previously acted.
Although on the surface it would seem that the relation of these
doctrines to "Fair Practices" legislation of the states has been thoroughly delineated by the Supreme Court in Bob-Lo Excursion Company v. Michigan,2 the recent decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court, Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission and Marlon D.
Green v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.3 has again brought the problem
to the front.
The Civil Rights Act of 18754 generally declared that all persons
were to be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommo1.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

2.

333 U.S. 28 (1948).

3. (-Colo.-) 368 P.2d 970 (1962)
No. 68, 10/8/62, Docket No. 146.
4.

18 Stat. 335.

petition for cert granted, No. 146 and

